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ARGUMENTS ARGUMENTS
FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
WHAT YOUR VOTE MEANS WHAT YOUR VOTE MEANS
SUMMARY SUMMARY
PROPOSITION Prescription Drug Discounts. 
State-Negotiated Rebates. 
Initiative Statute.
YES
A YES vote on this measure 
means: A new state drug 
discount program would be 
created to reduce the costs 
that certain residents of the 
state, including persons in 
families with an income at 
or below 400 percent of the 
federal poverty level, would 
pay for prescription drugs 
purchased at pharmacies. 
The new program would 
be linked to Medi-Cal for 
the purpose of obtaining 
rebates on drugs.
NO
A NO vote on this measure 
means: The state would not 
expand its drug discount 
program beyond an 
existing state program that 
assists elderly and disabled 
persons on Medicare.
PRO
Prop. 79 provides 
ENFORCEABLE discounts 
on prescription drugs for
millions of Californians.
Prop. 79 provides DEEPER
DISCOUNTS TO MORE
PEOPLE than the drug 
industry’s “voluntary” Prop. 78.
Prop. 79 saves taxpayers money 
by reducing prescription drug 
costs. JOIN CONSUMER, 
HEALTH, AND SENIOR 
CITIZEN ADVOCATES and 
VOTE YES on Prop. 79. 
CON
Proposition 79 can’t deliver 
what it promises. It’s based 
on a failed program from 
Maine that never took 
effect. Prop. 79 won’t receive 
federal approval because 
it threatens poor patients’ 
access to needed drugs. 
Proposition 79 creates a big 
government bureaucracy 
costing millions. Worse, trial 
lawyers can fi le thousands 
of frivolous lawsuits. 
www.calrxnow.org 
FOR
Anthony Wright
Health Access California
414 13th Street, Suite 450
Oakland, CA 94612
(510) 873-8787
awright@health-access.org
www.VoteYesOnProp79.com
AGAINST
Californians Against 
the Wrong Prescription  
1415 L Street, Suite 1250  
Sacramento, CA 95814
info@calrxnow.org
www.calrxnow.org
79
Provides drug discounts to Californians with qualifying 
incomes. Funded by state-negotiated drug manufacturer 
rebates. Prohibits Medi-Cal contracts with manufacturers 
not providing Medicaid best price. Fiscal Impact: State 
costs for administration and outreach in low tens of 
millions of dollars annually. State costs for advance 
funding for rebates. Unknown potentially signifi cant: 
(1) net costs or savings for Medi-Cal and (2) savings for 
state and county health programs.
PROPOSITION Electric Service Providers. 
Regulation. 
Initiative Statute. 
YES
A YES vote on this measure 
means: The Public Utilities 
Commission (PUC) would 
have broadened authority 
to regulate electric service 
providers. The PUC’s 
current policies related to 
the electricity procurement 
process, resource adequacy 
requirements, and the 
renewables portfolio standard 
would be put into law. Small 
electricity customers in 
existing buildings could not 
be required to accept time-
differentiated electricity 
rates without their consent. 
The current prohibition 
on new “direct access” for 
electricity service would be 
continued beyond 2015.
NO
A NO vote on this measure 
means: The PUC would not 
have broadened authority 
to regulate electric service 
providers. The PUC’s current
policies related to the electricity 
procurement process, resource 
adequacy requirements, and
the renewables portfolio 
standard would not be put 
into law. The PUC would 
determine whether and how 
small electricity customers 
in existing buildings would 
be required to have time-
differentiated electricity 
service. New “direct access” 
for electricity service would 
continue to be prohibited 
until 2015, after which 
time it would be allowed.
PRO
Vote YES to make sure 
we NEVER AGAIN face 
the blackouts and market 
manipulation caused by 
deregulation. Proposition 
80 guarantees a stable and 
reliable electric system with
ample supplies of clean,
affordable power and
increased use of renewable
resources. Vote YES for 
lower rates, environmental 
protection, and no more
deregulation.  
CON
Proposition 80 is a high-
risk, anticonsumer, anti-
environmental approach to 
California’s energy future. 
It limits green energy 
from solar and geothermal 
resources. This confusing 
measure won’t lower electric
bills, won’t prevent blackouts,
and eliminates consumer 
choice. Complex energy
policy should be developed 
with public hearings, not
through the initiative process. 
FOR
Mindy Spatt 
The Utility Reform 
Network (TURN)
711 Van Ness Avenue, 
Suite 350
San Francisco, CA 94102
(415) 929-8876 
info@yesonproposition80.com
www.yesonproposition80.com
AGAINST
Bob Pence
Californians for 
Reliable Electricity
1717 I Street
Sacramento, CA 95814
(916) 551-2513
www.noprop80.com
80
Subjects electric service providers to regulation by 
California Public Utilities Commission. Restricts electricity 
customers’ ability to switch from private utilities to other
providers. Requires all retail electric sellers to increase
renewable energy resource procurement by 2010.
Fiscal Impact: Potential annual administrative costs
ranging from negligible to $4 million, paid by fees. 
Unknown net impact on state and local costs and revenues 
from uncertain impact on electricity rates. 
ELECTRIC SERVICE PROVIDERS.
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Prepared by the Attorney General 
Electric Service Providers. Regulation. Initiative Statute.
• Subjects electric service providers, as defi ned, to control and regulation by California Public Utilities 
Commission. 
• Imposes restrictions on electricity customers’ ability to switch from private utilities to other electric 
providers. 
• Provides that registration by electric service providers with Commission constitutes providers’ consent to 
regulation. 
• Requires all retail electric sellers, instead of just private utilities, to increase renewable energy resource 
procurement by at least 1% each year, with 20% of retail sales procured from renewable energy by 2010, 
instead of current requirement of 2017. 
• Imposes duties on Commission, Legislature and electrical providers. 
Summary of Legislative Analyst’s Estimate of Net State and Local 
Government Fiscal Impact: 
• Potential annual state administrative costs ranging from negligible up to around $4 million for regulatory 
activities of the California Public Utilities Commission, paid for by fee revenues. 
• Unknown net impact on state and local government costs and revenues due to the measure’s uncertain 
impact on retail electricity rates. 
ANALYSIS BY THE LEGISLATIVE ANALYST
Background
Provision of Electricity Service. Californians 
generally receive their electricity service from one 
of three types of providers: investor owned utilities 
(IOUs), local publicly owned electric utilities, and 
electric service providers (ESPs). Investor owned 
utilities have a defi ned geographic service area 
and are required by law to serve customers in that 
area. The three largest electricity IOUs in the state 
are Pacifi c Gas & Electric Company, Southern 
California Edison Company, and San Diego Gas & 
Electric Company. The California Public Utilities 
Commission (PUC) regulates the IOUs’ rates and 
how electricity service is provided to their customers 
(commonly referred to as “terms of service”). (See 
the nearby text box for defi nitions of commonly used 
terms throughout this analysis.)
Publicly owned electric utilities are public entities 
that provide electric service to residents and 
businesses in their local area. Unlike IOUs, they are 
not regulated by the PUC. Major publicly owned 
electric utilities include the Los Angeles Department 
of Water and Power, the Sacramento Municipal 
Utility District, and the Imperial Irrigation District.
The ESPs provide retail electricity service to 
customers who have chosen not to receive electricity 
service from the utility that serves their area. 
Instead, these customers have entered into “direct 
access” contracts with ESPs for their electricity. 
This electricity is delivered to these ESP customers 
through the transmission and distribution system 
of their local utility. There are currently eighteen 
registered ESPs operating in the state, generally 
serving large industrial and commercial businesses. 
The ESPs also provide electricity to certain state and 
local government entities, such as the California 
State University system, several University of 
California campuses, some community college 
districts, and some local school districts. 
Under current law, ESPs are only required to 
register with the PUC for licensing purposes; their 
rates and terms of service are not regulated by 
the PUC. However, the PUC has applied certain 
additional requirements to ESPs (discussed below). 
Currently, the IOUs provide about 71 percent of 
the electricity in the state; publicly owned electric 
utilities provide 14 percent; ESPs provide 11 percent; 
and the state’s Department of Water Resources 
provides 4 percent (chiefl y for the operation of the 
State Water Project).
Deregulation and Direct Access. California began 
the process of restructuring electricity service in 
the early 1990s by introducing competition into 
the generation of electricity, with the ultimate goal 
being lower prices for IOU customers. The plan 
ultimately adopted in 1996 included a “transition” 
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period during which the IOUs were to sell off their 
fossil fuel power plants to independent generators, 
while retaining their hydroelectric and nuclear 
power plants. During this transition period, the PUC 
continued to regulate the IOUs’ rates. Eventually, 
however, electricity purchases and customer rates 
were to be determined in a competitive market. In 
such a market, customers could choose to have the 
IOUs purchase the electricity on their behalf, or 
they could purchase electric power directly from ESPs 
through “direct access.” 
The deregulation process was put on hold in 
response to the energy crisis that arose in 2000 and 
early 2001. At that time, the combination of sharply 
rising electricity demand, lagging investment in new 
power plants, and other factors led to electricity 
shortages and sharply rising prices. At that point, two 
of the IOUs were still under the transition period 
and therefore remained under PUC rate regulation. 
These IOUs were not permitted to pass along the 
sharply rising wholesale costs to their customers and 
were pushed into near fi nancial insolvency. 
In response to the energy crisis, the state began 
purchasing electricity on behalf of the IOUs and 
halted several aspects of deregulation. Among these, 
the state prevented the IOUs from continuing to 
sell their power plants and suspended new direct 
access for IOU customers. Under existing law, this 
suspension will continue until long-term electricity 
contracts signed on behalf of the IOUs by the 
Department of Water Resources expire. The last of 
the contracts expires in 2015.
While individual customers are currently barred 
from entering into direct access service, current 
law does allow a city or county to aggregate all the 
electrical demand of the residents, businesses, and 
municipal users under its jurisdiction and to meet 
this demand from an electricity provider other 
than the local IOU, such as an ESP. This variation 
on direct access is referred to as “community 
choice aggregation.”
Long-Term Procurement Process and Resource 
Adequacy Requirements. As required by current law, 
the PUC is currently overseeing a process through 
which the IOUs secure long-term electricity supplies 
through a competitive bidding process. Under this 
competitive “procurement process,” the IOUs select 
a mix of electricity supplied by their own power 
plants and electricity provided under contract from 
other generators to meet their long-term electricity 
needs. The PUC approved the IOUs’ fi rst long-term 
procurement plans in April 2004. 
COMMONLY USED TERMS—PROPOSITION 80
 Community Choice Aggregation—The authority 
of a city or county to aggregate all the electrical 
demand of the residents, businesses, and 
municipal users under its jurisdiction and to 
meet this demand from an electricity provider 
other than the electric utility currently serving 
that local area.
 Direct Access—Retail electricity service is 
provided to a customer directly from an electric 
service provider, rather than from the utility 
(local publicly owned or investor owned) that 
serves the customer’s area.
 ESP (Electric Service Provider)—Companies 
that provide retail electricity service directly 
to customers who have chosen not to receive 
service from the utility that serves their area. 
Customers of ESPs are referred to as “direct 
access” customers.
 IOU (Investor Owned Utility)—Privately owned 
electric utilities that have a defi ned geographic 
service area and are required by law to serve 
customers in that area. The Public Utilities 
Commission regulates the IOUs’ rates and terms 
of service.
 Procurement Process—The process, overseen 
by the Public Utilities Commission, through 
which the IOUs secure long-term electricity 
supplies through competitive bidding.
 PUC (Public Utilities Commission)—The state 
agency that regulates various types of utilities, 
including investor owned electric utilities.
 Renewables Portfolio Standard—Requirement 
that electricity providers increase their share of 
electricity generated from renewable sources 
(such as wind or solar power) according to a 
specifi ed timeline.
 Resource Adequacy Requirement—Requirement 
of the PUC that IOUs and ESPs show that 
they will have adequate electricity supplies to 
meet projected demand and maintain system 
reliability.
 Time-Differentiated Electricity Rates—An 
electricity rate structure under which customers 
would be charged different prices for electricity 
based on the time of day in which it is used, 
given that the availability and cost of providing 
electricity varies depending on the time of day.
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In addition, the PUC has adopted rules requiring 
both the IOUs and the ESPs to show that they will 
have enough electricity to meet projected demand, 
known as a resource adequacy requirement.
Renewables Portfolio Standard. Current law requires 
that electricity providers, including the IOUs, 
community choice aggregators, and ESPs, increase 
their share of electricity generated from renewable 
sources (such as solar or wind power) by 1 percent 
per year, up to 20 percent of their total electricity 
supply by 2017. This requirement is known as the 
renewables portfolio standard. 
The PUC has adopted a policy of accelerating 
the 20 percent requirement to 2010, but this is 
not required by law. Current law does not require 
electricity providers to continue to increase the 
proportion of their electricity from renewable 
sources once they have reached the 20 percent 
requirement. 
Time-Differentiated Electricity Rates. Generally, 
all but the largest electricity consumers pay 
electricity rates that do not change based on the 
time of day or season. The IOUs have submitted 
proposals to the PUC to implement a system of 
time-differentiated rates that would apply to more 
consumers. Under such a system, customers would 
be charged different prices for electricity based 
on the time of day in which it is used, given that 
the cost to the IOUs of providing electricity varies 
depending on the time of day. For example, during 
peak demand times, customers would pay higher 
rates, while they would pay lower rates during the 
lower demand times of the day. In theory, time-
differentiated pricing would encourage consumers 
to reduce electricity consumption during periods 
of peak demand, typically hot summer afternoons 
when electricity supply is the tightest and therefore 
its cost is high. The PUC is currently considering 
IOU proposals to implement time-differentiated 
rates in a regulatory proceeding, and has not yet 
determined how such a system of rates would be 
applied to more consumers.
Proposal
Overview of Measure. The measure addresses a 
number of aspects of the state’s electricity market: 
the regulation of the ESPs and direct access, 
the procurement process, resource adequacy 
requirements, the renewables portfolio standard, and 
the use of time-differentiated electricity rates. Each 
of these aspects is discussed below.
Regulation of ESPs. The measure places the ESPs 
under the “ jurisdiction, control and regulation” of 
the PUC. The measure specifi es that the scope of this 
regulation includes the enforcement of requirements 
related to energy procurement, contracting 
standards, resource adequacy, energy effi ciency, 
demand response, and the renewables portfolio 
standard. While the measure broadens the authority 
of the PUC to regulate the ESPs, it does not, however, 
specify the extent to which it would regulate ESP 
rates and terms of service.
Direct Access. In general, the measure bars any 
customer currently receiving electricity service 
from an IOU from switching to an ESP. Customers 
currently being served by direct access contracts with 
ESPs could continue to receive electricity service 
from ESPs, effectively “grandfathering” in their 
direct access service. Direct access customers could 
also return to IOU electricity service under specifi ed 
conditions. The measure does not restrict current or 
future community choice aggregation.
Procurement Process. The measure requires that the 
PUC implement a long-term procurement process, 
and directs the PUC to consider a series of factors in 
evaluating the IOUs’ long-term procurement plans. 
While the PUC generally now considers the factors 
listed in the measure, current law does not specify 
that all of these factors be considered.
The measure also requires that the fi rst priority 
for IOUs in procuring new electricity is to be from 
“cost-effective” energy effi ciency and conservation 
programs, followed by “cost-effective” renewable 
resources, and then from traditional sources such 
as fossil fuel burning power plants. This “loading 
order,” as it is known, has been adopted by the PUC, 
but is not currently required by law.
Resource Adequacy Requirement. The measure 
requires both the IOUs and ESPs to show that they 
are able to meet peak demand with adequate reserves 
to ensure system reliability. This puts into law current 
PUC practice.
Renewables Portfolio Standard. The measure 
accelerates to December 31, 2010, the deadline for 
the IOUs and ESPs to meet the 20 percent renewable 
resources requirement, consistent with a recent PUC 
decision. The measure also deletes a provision in 
existing law that explicitly provides that electricity 
providers are not required to increase their share 
of electricity from renewable sources once the 
20 percent requirement has been reached. 
ANALYSIS BY THE LEGISLATIVE ANALYST (CONTINUED)
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Time-Differentiated Electricity Rates. Under the 
measure, residential and small commercial customers 
with electricity use under a specifi ed amount and in 
a building built before January 2006 could not be 
required to pay time-differentiated electricity rates 
without their consent. 
Amending the Measure. The measure states that the 
Legislature may amend the measure only to achieve 
its “purposes and intent” and would require a two-
thirds vote of both legislative houses and signature 
of the Governor to do so. To the extent that the 
measure puts into law existing processes and 
policies of the PUC that are not currently required 
by law, the measure would make it more diffi cult 
for the state to modify these practices and policies 
when, for example, conditions in the electricity 
market change.
Fiscal Effects
State Administrative Costs to Implement Measure. The 
measure could increase the PUC’s administrative 
costs, largely depending on the extent to which 
the commission exercises the broadened authority 
given to it under the measure to regulate the ESPs. 
The fi scal impact on the PUC could range from a 
negligible cost up to around $4 million annually. 
The upper end of the range would occur if the 
PUC regulates the rates and terms of service of the 
ESPs. The measure, however, would not increase the 
PUC’s costs in areas where the measure puts into 
law existing PUC practices related to procurement, 
resource adequacy, and the renewables portfolio 
standard. Under current law, the potential 
additional costs would be funded by fees paid by 
electricity customers.
Uncertain Impact on State and Local Costs and 
Revenues. The primary fi scal effect of this measure 
on state and local governments would depend on the 
impact it would have on electricity rates.
Changes in electricity rates would affect 
government costs since state and local governments 
are large consumers of electricity. To the extent 
that the measure limits state and local governments 
from entering into new direct access contracts, 
the measure takes away an opportunity for these 
government entities to potentially reduce their 
electricity costs.
State and local revenues would be affected by the 
measure’s impact on electricity rates, since tax 
revenues received by governments are affected by 
business profi ts, personal income, and sales—all 
of which in turn are affected by what persons and 
businesses pay for electricity. 
It is not possible to determine the net effect of this 
measure on electricity rates (and hence state and 
local government costs and revenues), as the net 
impact would be infl uenced by several potentially 
offsetting factors. For example:
• To the extent that the measure increases certainty 
about the structure of the electricity market, this may 
encourage additional investment in the market. 
Such investment, including the construction of 
new generation, could increase the supply of 
electricity and potentially lower electricity rates.
• On the other hand, the measure’s ban on 
customers entering into new direct access 
contracts with ESPs could result in higher 
electricity rates over the long term by limiting 
competition in the retail electricity market. 
The measure’s impact on retail electricity rates 
would be infl uenced by a number of factors, 
including the specifi c structure of the regulations 
adopted by the PUC to implement the proposition.
80
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Five years ago, California was devastated by an electricity 
crisis. 
Enron and other energy traders held Californians 
hostage, extorting tens of billions of dollars from us. They 
manipulated the electricity market, driving up wholesale 
prices 1000%. Californians faced rolling blackouts and 
untold economic damage. 
Audiotapes released by the U.S. Justice Department 
revealed Enron energy traders boasting of “making 
buckets of money” by creating power shortages. One trader 
laughed about “all the money you guys stole from those 
poor grandmothers in California,” while another ordered a 
power plant worker to “ just go ahead and shut her down.” 
California’s failed experiment in electric deregulation 
cost our people and businesses billions of dollars. 
We learned many lessons from that disaster. The state 
has taken some positive steps to clean up the mess—but not 
nearly enough. Amazingly, legislation to require suffi cient 
supplies of electricity was vetoed by the Governor last year. 
That’s why Proposition 80—the Repeal of Deregulation 
and Blackout Prevention Act—is on the ballot. 
It provides critical reforms to make sure our deregulation 
nightmare never returns. 
It provides the stability necessary to ensure long-term 
investment in new, clean electricity supplies. 
Here’s how Proposition 80 accomplishes these goals: 
Lower rates. It requires independent generators and 
utilities to compete against each other to give ratepayers the 
best deal on new power plants. 
Adequate supplies. It requires all electricity providers 
to have enough power and reserves to keep the lights 
on. That simple requirement—critical to ending market 
manipulation and keeping the system stable—was vetoed 
last year. 
Market stability. It makes sure that utilities know how 
many customers they will have to serve, so they can make 
long-term investments in new supplies. Amazingly, 
deregulation advocates have pushed legislation that would 
create more uncertainty and destabilize the market. 
Regulation. It ensures that all electricity providers are 
subject to regulation and control, so that traders cannot 
manipulate the system. 
Renewables and energy effi ciency. It speeds up the shift 
to renewable energy, and gives fi rst priority to energy 
effi ciency programs. 
Ratepayer protection. It prevents small ratepayers from 
being forced onto potentially expensive time-of-use rates 
without their consent—especially important in hot climates. 
Proposition 80 was carefully drafted by the state’s 
foremost consumer advocates and legal experts. It allows for 
amendments by the Legislature consistent with its purposes, 
to adjust to changing times. 
Proposition 80 is a common-sense measure that achieves 
a clear goal: 
Never again will California be taken to the cleaners by 
greedy energy traders. 
Never again will we be subject to rolling blackouts and 
skyrocketing electricity prices because of power shortages 
and market manipulation. 
Instead, Proposition 80 means that Californians can 
look forward to getting the cleanest, greenest energy at the 
lowest possible prices. 
Proposition 80 means that Californians can expect a 
stable electricity future, with sensible long-term investment 
in cost-effective energy solutions. 
That’s why consumers, seniors, environmentalists, 
business groups, labor organizations, minority groups, and 
people from all walks of life support Proposition 80. 
ROBERT FINKELSTEIN, Executive Director 
The Utility Reform Network (TURN) 
RICHARD HOLOBER, Executive Director 
Consumer Federation of California 
NAN BRASMER, President 
California Alliance of Retired Americans 
Proposition 80 is the wrong way to make energy policy for 
California. The initiative would lock in renewable energy goals 
established back in 2002, even though environmental groups 
and Governor Schwarzenegger have urged that California 
should set higher targets for renewable energy. The initiative 
would make it harder for the Legislature to pass a stronger 
renewable plan in the future. 
Proposition 80 is the wrong way for California. Vote NO on 
Proposition 80. 
V. John White, Executive Director 
Center for Energy Effi ciency and Renewable Technologies 
We agree with Mr. White and believe the proponents’ confusing 
argument shows just how risky Proposition 80 really is. No one 
wants to relive the Enron Era. This vote is about the future, 
not the past. 
PROPOSITION 80 IS POORLY WRITTEN, RISKY ENERGY 
POLICY. IT’S BAD FOR CONSUMERS AND BAD FOR THE 
ENVIRONMENT. Energy policy is too complex for the initiative 
process and should be developed through a more comprehensive 
approach that includes public hearings. 
What does Proposition 80 mean to you? 
PROPOSITION 80 WON’T PREVENT ANOTHER ENERGY 
CRISIS OR FUTURE BLACKOUTS. In fact, it could stall 
investment in new power plants California needs to prevent another 
energy crisis. 
PROPOSITION 80 WON’T LOWER YOUR ELECTRIC BILL 
AND IT ELIMINATES CUSTOMER CHOICE. Proposition 80 
prohibits power consumers like schools and hospitals from buying 
cheaper and cleaner energy, making needed goods and services more 
expensive and placing our environment at risk. 
Proposition 80 is too risky. Protect consumers and the 
environment. Vote No on Proposition 80. 
LES NELSON, President
California Solar Energy Industries Association 
DOROTHY ROTHROCK, Co-Chair
Californians for Reliable Electricity 
TONY VALENZUELA, Associate Vice President
Facilities, Development and Operations at 
 San Jose State University 
Rebuttal to Argument in Favor of Proposition 80
Electric Service Providers. Regulation.
Initiative Statute.
Argument Against Proposition 80
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Proposition 80 is a high-risk approach that could hurt 
consumers, the environment and the state’s economy. This deeply 
fl awed measure will undermine the security of state energy supplies, 
undercut the availability of affordable electricity and undercut 
the construction of environmentally-friendly renewable energy 
generation from wind, solar, and geothermal resources. 
It will sharply restrict consumer choice about who we buy our 
electricity from and how much we pay for services. It could 
well lead us down the road toward another serious energy 
crisis. That’s because Proposition 80 is the wrong way to 
make energy policy for California. 
Reinventing California’s energy system through the 
initiative process, without public hearings is too great a risk 
to take. Instead, this critical issue should be addressed 
carefully through public hearings that involve all affected 
parties, including the state Utility and Energy Commissions, 
consumer groups, and small business associations. 
Because Proposition 80 takes away energy choices and 
price competition, energy cost savings will be limited or lost 
for many of California’s vital institutions such as community 
colleges, the University of California and the State 
University systems, local school districts, hospitals, and city 
and county governments. Taxpayers, students, teachers, and 
patients will ultimately pay for these higher energy costs. 
PROPOSITION 80 TAKES AWAY THE RIGHT OF 
CONSUMERS AND BUSINESSES TO CHOOSE AN ENERGY 
SUPPLIER THAT CAN SAVE MONEY. Just when California 
needs more jobs and investments in our infrastructure to 
help our economy, Proposition 80 sends the wrong signal 
of uncertainty and risk. Proposition 80 takes away an 
energy choice that often attracts high paying jobs and 
new investment.
Proposition 80 would make it extremely diffi cult to improve the 
State’s standards for generating electricity from renewable sources, 
which could seriously undermine adoption of wind, solar, and 
geothermal technologies. Growth of California’s green businesses 
could be placed at risk.
Electricity regulation is too risky to be addressed through the 
initiative process. Flaws in this measure will be very diffi cult 
or impossible to fi x. Proposition 80 is bad policy because it:
• Restricts energy choices for all consumers, big and small.
• Limits the market for increasing solar, wind, and 
geothermal energy resources—even if demanded by 
consumers.
• Threatens to increase the cost of energy for community 
colleges, the University of California and State University 
systems, hospitals, and local governments that will end 
up being paid by taxpayers.
• Discourages future jobs and business investment in 
California.
• Destabilizes the current progress toward a secure energy 
future for California.
Proposition 80 IS A HIGH RISK PROPOSITION THAT WILL 
HURT CONSUMERS AND THE ENVIRONMENT. Vote NO on 
Proposition 80. 
LES NELSON, President
California Solar Energy Industries Association 
KARL GAWELL, Executive Director
Geothermal Energy Association 
JAMES SWEENEY, Co-Director of the Energy,
 Natural Resources and the Environment Program at the 
 Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research 
The opponents’ argument makes the case FOR 
Proposition 80. They want to bring back deregulation by 
calling it consumer choice! 
The fi rst round of deregulation also emphasized 
“consumer choice.” The “choice” for consumers was higher 
rates, market manipulation, and rolling blackouts. 
Deregulation brought a reliable electric system to its 
knees. It allowed traders to manipulate the market. Enron 
signed up the University of California—and then walked 
away. The State was forced into expensive long-term 
contracts to clean up the mess! And ordinary consumers had no 
real choices. 
Proposition 80 reins in deregulation and ensures that 
electricity providers are accountable in the future. That’s the 
number one reason you should vote for it. 
The opponents’ other claims are simply wrong. 
Renewables? Proposition 80 not only speeds up from 
2017 to 2010 the deadline for purchasing 20% of our energy 
needs from renewables, it repeals the existing legal limit on 
utilities’ purchases of renewables. How can that be bad for 
renewable energy? 
Misuse of the initiative process? Major provisions of 
Proposition 80 passed the Legislature but were vetoed at the 
urging of energy company lobbyists. This is exactly what the 
initiative process was designed for. 
Competition? Proposition 80 embraces competition 
between independent generators and utilities to build 
power plants at the lowest cost to consumers. 
Don’t be swayed by fear tactics from the energy 
companies! We’ve had enough failure. Proposition 80 will 
stabilize the electrical system, avoid blackouts, bring rates 
down, and benefi t all Californians. 
Vote YES on Proposition 80. 
MIKE MOWREY, International Vice-President, 9th District 
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO 
HENRY L. (HANK) LACAYO, State President 
Congress of California Seniors 
STEVE BLACKLEDGE, Policy Director 
California Public Interest Research Group (CalPIRG) 
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(b) As an alternative to the adoption of regulations pursuant 
to subdivision (a), and notwithstanding Chapter 3.5 (commencing 
with Section 11340) of Part 1 of Division 3 of Title 2 of the 
Government Code, the director may implement this article, in 
whole or in part, by means of a provider bulletin or other similar 
instructions, without taking regulatory action, provided that no 
such bulletin or other similar instructions shall remain in effect 
after July 31, 2007. It is the intent that regulations adopted pursuant 
to subdivision (a) shall be in place on or before July 31, 2007. 
CHAPTER 7.  ENFORCEMENT 
130570.  The Attorney General, upon the Attorney General’s 
own initiative or upon petition of the department or of 50 or more 
residents of the state, shall investigate suspected violations of this 
division. 
130571.  The Attorney General may require, by summons, 
the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of 
books and papers before the Attorney General related to any such 
matter under investigation. The summons must be served in the 
same manner as summonses for witnesses in criminal cases, and 
all provisions of law related to criminal cases apply to summonses 
issued under this section so far as they are applicable. All 
investigations or hearings under this section to which witnesses are 
summoned or called upon to testify or to produce books, records, 
or correspondence are public or private at the choice of the person 
summoned and must be held in the county where the act to be 
investigated is alleged to have been committed, or if the investigation 
is on petition, it must be held in the county in which the petitioners 
reside. 
130572.  A court of competent jurisdiction may by order, 
upon application of the Attorney General, compel the attendance 
of witnesses, the production of books and papers, including 
correspondence, and the giving of testimony before the Attorney 
General in the same manner and to the same extent as before the 
superior court. Any failure to obey such an order may be punishable 
by that court as a contempt. 
130574.  If the Attorney General fails to act within 180 days to 
investigate suspected violations of this division, any person acting 
for the interests of itself, its members, or the general public may 
seek to obtain, in addition to other remedies, injunctive relief and 
a civil penalty in an amount of up to one hundred thousand dollars 
($100,000) or three times the amount of the damages, plus the costs 
of suit, including necessary and reasonable investigative costs, 
reasonable expert fees, and reasonable attorney’s fees. 
SEC. 1.5.  Division 112.5 (commencing with Section 130600) is 
added to the Health and Safety Code, to read:
DIVISION 112.5.  PROFITEERING 
IN PRESCRIPTION DRUGS 
130600.  Profi teering in prescription drugs is unlawful and is 
subject to the provisions of this section. The provisions of this section 
apply to manufacturers, distributors, and labelers of prescription drugs. 
A manufacturer, distributor, or labeler of prescription drugs engages in 
illegal profi teering if that manufacturer, distributor or labeler: 
(a) Exacts or demands an unconscionable price; 
(b) Exacts or demands prices or terms that lead to any unjust or 
unreasonable profi t; 
(c) Discriminates unreasonably against any person in the sale, 
exchange, distribution, or handling of prescription drugs dispensed or 
delivered in the state; or 
(d) Intentionally prevents, limits, lessens, or restricts the sale or 
distribution of prescription drugs in this state in retaliation for the 
provisions of this chapter. 
130601.  Each violation of this division is a civil violation for 
which the Attorney General or any person acting for the interests of 
itself, its members, or the general public may obtain, in addition to 
other remedies, injunctive relief and a civil penalty in an amount of 
one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000) or three times the amount 
of the damages, whichever is greater, plus the costs of suit, including 
necessary and reasonable investigative costs, reasonable expert fees, 
and reasonable attorney’s fees. 
SEC. 2.  (a) This act shall be broadly construed and applied in 
order to fully promote its underlying purposes. If any provision of this 
initiative confl icts directly or indirectly with any other provisions of law, 
or any other statute previously enacted by the Legislature, it is the intent 
of the voters that such provisions shall be null and void to the extent that 
they are inconsistent with this initiative and are hereby repealed. 
(b) No provision of this act may be amended by the Legislature 
except to further the purposes of that provision by a statute passed in 
each house by roll call vote entered in the journal, two-thirds of the 
membership concurring, or by a statute that becomes effective only 
when approved by the electorate. No amendment by the Legislature 
shall be deemed to further the purposes of this act unless it furthers the 
purpose of the specifi c provision of this act that is being amended. In 
any judicial action with respect to any legislative amendment, the 
court shall exercise its independent judgment as to whether or not the 
amendment satisfi es the requirements of this subdivision. 
(c) If any provision of this act or the application thereof to any 
person or circumstances is held invalid, that invalidity shall not affect 
other provisions or applications of the act that can be given effect in 
the absence of the invalid provision or application. To this end, the 
provisions of this act are severable. 
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PROPOSITION 80
This initiative measure is submitted to the people in accordance with 
the provisions of Section 8 of Article II of the California Constitution.
This initiative measure  amends, repeals, and adds sections to the 
Public Utilities Code; therefore, existing provisions proposed to be 
deleted are printed in strikeout type and new provisions proposed to be 
added are printed in italic type to indicate that they are new.
PROPOSED LAW
Section 1.  This measure shall be known and may be cited as “The 
Repeal of Electricity Deregulation and Blackout Prevention Act.”
Section 2.  (a) The people of the State of California fi nd and 
declare all of the following: 
(1) A reliable electricity system that delivers power to all consumers 
at just and reasonable prices is vital to the health, safety, and well-being 
of all Californians. 
(2) Electricity is a unique good in modern society. It cannot be 
stored, must be delivered to the entire grid at the same time it is 
produced, and has no substitutes. Failure of supply for even a few 
seconds can lead to blackouts and disruption. 
(3) The deregulation of the electricity market in California was a 
disastrous, ill-conceived experiment that led to rolling blackouts, supply 
shortages, and market manipulation, resulting in billions of dollars in 
excessive prices being borne by California ratepayers. 
(4) The fi nancial crisis and regulatory uncertainty that were created 
by the deregulated market have stifl ed investment in needed power plants. 
(5) Deregulation of electricity, including the authorization of direct 
transactions, creates uncertainty regarding the customer base that must 
be served, making it impossible to conduct the long-term integrated 
resource planning that is necessary for an environmentally sound 
and reliable electricity system, and enables cost-shifting from large 
customers to small. 
(6) Despite the past failures of electricity deregulation, its 
advocates are once again urging the Legislature and the Public Utilities 
Commission to launch a further experiment that may infl ict additional 
damage on ratepayers and the California economy. 
(b) In enacting this measure, it is the intent of the people to achieve 
the following policy goals: 
(1) Ensure that all customers receive reliable retail electric service at 
just and reasonable rates. 
(2) Provide a stable customer base for planning purposes, in order 
to assure resource adequacy and prevent inappropriate cost shifting. 
To that end, no new direct transactions shall be permitted, except as 
provided in this measure. 
(3) Ensure that all rates, terms, and conditions of retail electric service 
are regulated by the Public Utilities Commission in a non-discriminatory 
manner as to all suppliers of retail electric service, and that all electricity 
service providers are under the jurisdiction of the commission. 
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(4) Ensure that the electrical system is developed in a manner 
that mitigates and minimizes any adverse environmental impacts to 
the maximum extent reasonably practicable by, among other things, 
requiring that each retail seller of electricity obtain at least 20 percent 
of its retail sales from eligible renewable energy resources no later than 
December 31, 2010. 
Section 3.  Section 218.3 of the Public Utilities Code is amended 
to read: 
218.3.  “Electric service provider” means an entity that offers 
electrical service to customers within the service territory of an 
electrical corporation, as defi ned in Section 218, but does not include 
an entity that offers electrical service solely to service customer load 
consistent with subdivision (b) of Section 218, and does not include an 
electrical corporation, as defi ned in Section 218, or a public agency that 
offers electrical service to residential and small commercial customers 
within its jurisdiction, or within the service territory of a local 
publicly owned electric utility. “Electric service provider” includes 
the unregulated affi liates and subsidiaries of an electrical corporation, 
as defi ned in Section 218. An electric service provider is subject to 
the jurisdiction, control, and regulation of the commission and the 
provisions of this part, pursuant to subdivision (f) of Section 394. 
Section 4.  Section 330 of the Public Utilities Code is repealed. 
330.  In order to provide guidance in carrying out this chapter, the 
Legislature fi nds and declares all of the following:
(a) It is the intent of the Legislature that a cumulative rate reduction 
of at least 20 percent be achieved not later than April 1, 2002, for 
residential and small commercial customers, from the rates in effect on 
June 10, 1996. In determining that the April 1, 2002, rate reduction has 
been met, the commission shall exclude the costs of the competitively 
procured electricity and the costs associated with the rate reduction 
bonds, as defi ned in Section 840.
(b) The people, businesses, and institutions of California spend 
nearly twenty-three billion dollars ($23,000,000,000) annually 
on electricity, so that reductions in the price of electricity would 
signifi cantly benefi t the economy of the state and its residents.
(c) The Public Utilities Commission has opened rulemaking and 
investigation proceedings with regard to restructuring California’s 
electric power industry and reforming utility regulation.
(d) The commission has found, after an extensive public review 
process, that the interests of ratepayers and the state as a whole will 
be best served by moving from the regulatory framework existing 
on January 1, 1997, in which retail electricity service is provided 
principally by electrical corporations subject to an obligation to provide 
ultimate consumers in exclusive service territories with reliable electric 
service at regulated rates, to a framework under which competition 
would be allowed in the supply of electric power and customers would 
be allowed to have the right to choose their supplier of electric power.
(e) Competition in the electric generation market will encourage 
innovation, effi ciency, and better service from all market participants, 
and will permit the reduction of costly regulatory oversight.
(f) The delivery of electricity over transmission and distribution 
systems is currently regulated, and will continue to be regulated to 
ensure system safety, reliability, environmental protection, and fair 
access for all market participants.
(g) Reliable electric service is of utmost importance to the safety, 
health, and welfare of the state’s citizenry and economy. It is the intent 
of the Legislature that electric industry restructuring should enhance 
the reliability of the interconnected regional transmission systems, and 
provide strong coordination and enforceable protocols for all users of 
the power grid.
(h) It is important that suffi cient supplies of electric generation 
will be available to maintain the reliable service to the citizens and 
businesses of the state.
(i) Reliable electric service depends on conscientious inspection and 
maintenance of transmission and distribution systems. To continue and 
enhance the reliability of the delivery of electricity, the Independent 
System Operator and the commission, respectively, should set 
inspection, maintenance, repair, and replacement standards.
(j) It is the intent of the Legislature that California enter into a 
compact with western region states. That compact should require 
the publicly and investor-owned utilities located in those states, that 
sell energy to California retail customers, to adhere to enforceable 
standards and protocols to protect the reliability of the interconnected 
regional transmission and distribution systems.
(k) In order to achieve meaningful wholesale and retail competition in 
the electric generation market, it is essential to do all of the following:
(1) Separate monopoly utility transmission functions from 
competitive generation functions, through development of independent, 
third-party control of transmission access and pricing.
(2) Permit all customers to choose from among competing suppliers 
of electric power.
(3) Provide customers and suppliers with open, nondiscriminatory, 
and comparable access to transmission and distribution services.
(l) The commission has properly concluded that:
(1) This competition will best be introduced by the creation of an 
Independent System Operator and an independent Power Exchange.
(2) Generation of electricity should be open to competition.
(3) There is a need to ensure that no participant in these new market 
institutions has the ability to exercise signifi cant market power so that 
operation of the new market institutions would be distorted.
(4) These new market institutions should commence simultaneously 
with the phase in of customer choice, and the public will be best served 
if these institutions and the nonbypassable transition cost recovery 
mechanism referred to in subdivisions (s) to (w), inclusive, are in place 
simultaneously and no later than January 1, 1998.
(m) It is the intention of the Legislature that California’s publicly 
owned electric utilities and investor-owned electric utilities should 
commit control of their transmission facilities to the Independent 
System Operator. These utilities should jointly advocate to the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission a pricing methodology for the 
Independent System Operator that results in an equitable return on 
capital investment in transmission facilities for all Independent System 
Operator participants.
(n) Opportunities to acquire electric power in the competitive 
market must be available to California consumers as soon as 
practicable, but no later than January 1, 1998, so that all customers can 
share in the benefi ts of competition.
(o) Under the existing regulatory framework, California’s electrical 
corporations were granted franchise rights to provide electricity to 
consumers in their service territories.
(p) Consistent with federal and state policies, California electrical 
corporations invested in power plants and entered into contractual 
obligations in order to provide reliable electrical service on a 
nondiscriminatory basis to all consumers within their service territories 
who requested service.
(q) The cost of these investments and contractual obligations are 
currently being recovered in electricity rates charged by electrical 
corporations to their consumers.
(r) Transmission and distribution of electric power remain essential 
services imbued with the public interest that are provided over facilities 
owned and maintained by the state’s electrical corporations.
(s) It is proper to allow electrical corporations an opportunity to 
continue to recover, over a reasonable transition period, those costs 
and categories of costs for generation-related assets and obligations, 
including costs associated with any subsequent renegotiation or buyout 
of existing generation-related contracts, that the commission, prior to 
December 20, 1995, had authorized for collection in rates and that may 
not be recoverable in market prices in a competitive generation market, 
and appropriate additions incurred after December 20, 1995, for capital 
additions to generating facilities existing as of December 20, 1995, that 
the commission determines are reasonable and should be recovered, 
provided that the costs are necessary to maintain those facilities 
through December 31, 2001. In determining the costs to be recovered, 
it is appropriate to net the negative value of above market assets against 
the positive value of below market assets.
(t) The transition to a competitive generation market should be 
orderly, protect electric system reliability, provide the investors in these 
electrical corporations with a fair opportunity to fully recover the costs 
associated with commission approved generation-related assets and 
obligations, and be completed as expeditiously as possible.
(u) The transition to expanded customer choice, competitive 
markets, and performance based ratemaking as described in 
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Decision 95-12-063, as modifi ed by Decision 96-01-009, of the Public 
Utilities Commission, can produce hardships for employees who have 
dedicated their working lives to utility employment. It is preferable that 
any necessary reductions in the utility workforce directly caused by 
electrical restructuring, be accomplished through offers of voluntary 
severance, retraining, early retirement, outplacement, and related 
benefi ts. Whether workforce reductions are voluntary or involuntary, 
reasonable costs associated with these sorts of benefi ts should be 
included in the competition transition charge.
(v) Charges associated with the transition should be collected over 
a specifi c period of time on a nonbypassable basis and in a manner 
that does not result in an increase in rates to customers of electrical 
corporations. In order to insulate the policy of nonbypassability against 
incursions, if exemptions from the competition transition charge are 
granted, a fi rewall shall be created that segregates recovery of the cost 
of exemptions as follows:
(1) The cost of the competition transition charge exemptions granted 
to members of the combined class of residential and small commercial 
customers shall be recovered only from those customers.
(2) The cost of the competition transition charge exemptions granted 
to members of the combined class of customers other than residential 
and small commercial customers shall be recovered only from those 
customers. The commission shall retain existing cost allocation authority 
provided that the fi rewall and rate freeze principles are not violated.
(w) It is the intent of the Legislature to require and enable electrical 
corporations to monetize a portion of the competition transition 
charge for residential and small commercial consumers so that these 
customers will receive rate reductions of no less than 10 percent for 
1998 continuing through 2002. Electrical corporations shall, by June 1, 
1997, or earlier, secure the means to fi nance the competition transition 
charge by applying concurrently for fi nancing orders from the Public 
Utilities Commission and for rate reduction bonds from the California 
Infrastructure and Economic Development Bank.
(x) California’s public utility electrical corporations provide 
substantial benefi ts to all Californians, including employment and 
support of the state’s economy. Restructuring the electric services 
industry pursuant to the act that added this chapter will continue these 
benefi ts, and will also offer meaningful and immediate rate reductions 
for residential and small commercial customers, and facilitate 
competition in the supply of electric power.
Section 5.  Section 365 of the Public Utilities Code is repealed.
365.  The actions of the commission pursuant to this chapter shall 
be consistent with the fi ndings and declarations contained in Section 
330. In addition, the commission shall do all of the following:
(a) Facilitate the efforts of the state’s electrical corporations to 
develop and obtain authorization from the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission for the creation and operation of an Independent System 
Operator and an independent Power Exchange, for the determination 
of which transmission and distribution facilities are subject to the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the commission, and for approval, to the extent 
necessary, of the cost recovery mechanism established as provided in 
Sections 367 to 376, inclusive. The commission shall also participate 
fully in all proceedings before the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission in connection with the Independent System Operator 
and the independent Power Exchange, and shall encourage the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission to adopt protocols and procedures 
that strengthen the reliability of the interconnected transmission 
grid, encourage all publicly owned utilities in California to become 
full participants, and maximize enforceability of such protocols and 
procedures by all market participants.
(b) (1) Authorize direct transactions between electricity suppliers 
and end use customers, subject to implementation of the nonbypassable 
charge referred to in Sections 367 to 376, inclusive. Direct transactions 
shall commence simultaneously with the start of an Independent System 
Operator and Power Exchange referred to in subdivision (a). The 
simultaneous commencement shall occur as soon as practicable, but no 
later than January 1, 1998. The commission shall develop a phase-in 
schedule at the conclusion of which all customers shall have the right to 
engage in direct transactions. Any phase-in of customer eligibility for 
direct transactions ordered by the commission shall be equitable to all 
customer classes and accomplished as soon as practicable, consistent 
with operational and other technological considerations, and shall be 
completed for all customers by January 1, 2002.
(2) Customers shall be eligible for direct access irrespective of any 
direct access phase-in implemented pursuant to this section if at least 
one-half of that customer’s electrical load is supplied by energy from a 
renewable resource provider certifi ed pursuant to Section 383, provided 
however that nothing in this section shall provide for direct access for 
electric consumers served by municipal utilities unless so authorized by 
the governing board of that municipal utility.
Section 6.  Section 365.5 of the Public Utilities Code is repealed.
365.5.  Nothing in this chapter shall prevent the commission from 
exercising its authority to investigate a process for certifi cation and 
regulation of the rates, charges, terms, and conditions of default service. 
If the commission determines that a process for certifi cation and 
regulation of default service is in the public interest, the commission 
shall submit its fi ndings and recommendations to the Legislature 
for approval.
Section 7.  Section 366 of the Public Utilities Code is repealed.
366.  (a) The commission shall take actions as needed to facilitate 
direct transactions between electricity suppliers and 
end-use customers. Customers shall be entitled to aggregate their 
electrical loads on a voluntary basis, provided that each customer does 
so by a positive written declaration. If no positive declaration is made 
by a customer, that customer shall continue to be served by the existing 
electrical corporation or its successor in interest, except aggregation by 
community choice aggregators, accomplished pursuant to Section 366.2.
(b) Aggregation of customer electrical load shall be authorized by 
the commission for all customer classes, including, but not limited, 
to small commercial or residential customers. Aggregation may 
be accomplished by private market aggregators, special districts, 
or on any other basis made available by market opportunities and 
agreeable by positive written declaration by individual consumers, 
except aggregation by community choice aggregators, which shall be 
accomplished pursuant to Section 366.2.
Section 8.  Section 366 is added to the Public Utilities Code, to read:
366.  (a) No new direct transactions for retail electric service 
may be entered into after the effective date of this act, except by those 
customers of an electrical corporation who were being served via a 
direct transaction on January 1, 2005. 
(b) A customer who was being served via a direct transaction on 
January 1, 2005, may return to service by an electrical corporation 
upon one year’s notice to the electrical corporation, and thereafter may 
not enter into a new direct transaction. If a customer returns to service 
by an electrical corporation prior to the expiration of the one year 
notice period, that customer shall pay a generation rate that is equal to 
the higher of the electrical corporation’s bundled generation portfolio 
price or the current short-term market price until the one year notice 
period has elapsed. 
(c) A customer that was being served via a direct transaction on 
January 1, 2005, may take temporary default service from an 
electrical corporation, at a generation rate that is equal to the higher 
of the electrical corporation’s bundled generation portfolio price or the 
current short-term market price, for a period of no longer than 
120 days. If the customer does not enter into a new direct transaction 
by the end of the 120 day period, that customer may not thereafter 
enter into a new direct transaction, and shall continue to be served 
by the electrical corporation at the default service rate for a period 
of one year, at which point the customer will be charged the bundled 
generation portfolio price. 
(d) Any customer that the commission has determined, in its 
Decision 02-11-022, is responsible to pay a cost recovery surcharge as 
a condition of having purchased electricity via a direct transaction shall 
continue to pay the cost recovery surcharge until full collection is achieved. 
(e) Nothing in this section alters the provisions of Sections 366.1 and 
366.2, relating to community choice aggregation. 
Section 9.  Section 394 of the Public Utilities Code is amended 
to read:
394.  (a) As used in this section, “electric service provider” means 
an entity that offers electrical service to customers within the service 
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territory of an electrical corporation, but does not include an electrical 
corporation, as defi ned in Section 218, does not include an entity that 
offers electrical service solely to serve customer load consistent with 
subdivision (b) of Section 218, and does not include a public agency that 
offers electrical service to residential and small commercial customers 
within its jurisdiction, or within the service territory of a local 
publicly owned electric utility. “Electric service provider” includes the 
unregulated affi liates and subsidiaries of an electrical corporation, as 
defi ned in Section 218. 
(b) Each electric service provider shall register with the commission. 
As a precondition to registration, the electric service provider shall 
provide, under oath, declaration, or affi davit, all of the following 
information to the commission: 
(1) Legal name and any other names under which the electric service 
provider is doing business in California. 
(2) Current telephone number. 
(3) Current address. 
(4) Agent for service of process. 
(5) State and date of incorporation, if any. 
(6) Number for a customer contact representative, or other personnel 
for receiving customer inquiries. 
(7) Brief description of the nature of the service being provided. 
(8) Disclosure of any civil, criminal, or regulatory sanctions or 
penalties imposed within the 10 years immediately prior to registration, 
against the company or any owner, partner, offi cer, or director of the 
company pursuant to any state or federal consumer protection law 
or regulation, and of any felony convictions of any kind against the 
company or any owner, partner, offi cer, or director of the company. In 
addition, each electric service provider shall furnish the commission 
with fi ngerprints for those owners, partners, offi cers, and managers 
of the electric service provider specifi ed by any commission decision 
applicable to all electric service providers. The commission shall 
submit completed fi ngerprint cards to the Department of Justice. Those 
fi ngerprints shall be available for use by the Department of Justice and 
the Department of Justice may transmit the fi ngerprints to the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation for a national criminal history record check. 
The commission may use information obtained from a national criminal 
history record check conducted pursuant to this section to determine an 
electric service provider’s eligibility for registration. 
(9) Proof of fi nancial viability. The commission shall develop 
uniform standards for determining fi nancial viability and shall publish 
those standards for public comment no later than March 31, 1998. In 
determining the fi nancial viability of the electric service provider, 
the commission shall take into account the number of customers the 
potential registrant expects to serve, the number of kilowatthours of 
electricity it expects to provide, and any other appropriate criteria to 
ensure that residential and small commercial customers have adequate 
recourse in the event of fraud or nonperformance. 
(10) Proof of technical and operational ability. The commission shall 
develop uniform standards for determining technical and operational 
capacity and shall publish those standards for public comment no later 
than March 31, 1998. 
(c) Any registration fi ling approved by the commission prior to the 
effective date of this section which does not comply in all respects with 
the requirements of subdivision (a) of Section 394 shall nevertheless 
continue in force and effect so long as within 90 days of the effective 
date of this section the electric service provider undertakes to 
supplement its registration fi ling to the satisfaction of the commission. 
Any registration that is not supplemented by the required information 
within the time set forth in this subdivision shall be suspended by the 
commission and shall not be reinstated until the commission has 
found the registration to be in full compliance with subdivision (a) of 
Section 394. 
(d) Any public agency offering aggregation services as provided for 
in Section 366 solely to retail electric customers within its jurisdiction 
that has registered with the commission prior to the enactment of this 
section may voluntarily withdraw its registration to the extent that it is 
exempted from registration under this chapter. 
(e) Before reentering the market, electric service providers whose 
registration has been revoked shall fi le a formal application with the 
commission that satisfi es the requirements set forth in Section 394.1 and 
demonstrates the fi tness and ability of the electric service provider to 
comply with all applicable rules of the commission. 
(f) Registration with the commission is an exercise of the licensing 
function of the commission, and does not constitute regulation of the 
rates or terms and conditions of service offered by electric service 
providers. Nothing in this part authorizes the commission to regulate 
the rates or terms and conditions of service offered by electric service 
providers.
(f) Registration with the commission is an exercise of the licensing 
function of the commission, and registration by an electric service 
provider constitutes agreement of the electric service provider to 
the jurisdiction, control, and regulation of its rates and terms and 
conditions of service by the commission. The commission shall 
exercise such jurisdiction, control, and regulation of electric service 
providers in their provision of electrical service in the same manner 
as its exercise of jurisdiction, control, and regulation of electrical 
corporations, including, but not limited to, enforcement of: energy 
procurement and contracting standards and requirements; resource 
adequacy requirements; energy effi ciency and demand response 
requirements; renewable portfolio standards; and appropriate 
assignment of costs among customers to prevent cost shifting. 
Section 10.  Section 399.15 of the Public Utilities Code is amended 
to read: 
399.15.  (a) In order to fulfi ll unmet long-term resource needs, the 
commission shall establish a renewables portfolio standard requiring 
all electrical corporations to procure a minimum quantity of output 
from eligible renewable energy resources as a specifi ed percentage of 
total kilowatthours sold to their retail end-use customers each calendar 
year, if suffi cient funds are made available pursuant to paragraph (2), 
and Section 399.6 and Chapter 8.6 (commencing with Section 25740) 
of Division 15 of the Public Resources Code, to cover the above-market 
costs of eligible renewables, and subject to all of the following: 
(1) An electric corporation shall not be required to enter into 
long-term contracts with eligible renewable energy resources that exceed 
the market prices established pursuant to subdivision (c) of this section. 
(2) The Energy Commission shall provide supplemental energy 
payments from funds in the New Renewable Resources Account in the 
Renewable Resource Trust Fund to eligible renewable energy resources 
pursuant to Chapter 8.6 (commencing with Section 25740) of Division 
15 of the Public Resources Code, consistent with this article, for 
above-market costs. Indirect costs associated with the purchase of 
eligible renewable energy resources, such as imbalance energy charges, 
sale of excess energy, decreased generation from existing resources, 
or transmission upgrades shall not be eligible for supplemental energy 
payments, but shall be recoverable by an electrical corporation in rates, 
as authorized by the commission. 
(3) For purposes of setting annual procurement targets, the 
commission shall establish an initial baseline for each electrical 
corporation based on the actual percentage of retail sales procured 
from eligible renewable energy resources in 2001, and, to the extent 
applicable, adjusted going forward pursuant to subdivision (a) of 
Section 399.12. 
(b) The commission shall implement annual procurement targets for 
each electrical corporation as follows: 
(1) Beginning on January 1, 2003, each electrical corporation shall, 
pursuant to subdivision (a), increase its total procurement of eligible 
renewable energy resources by at least an additional 1 percent of retail 
sales per year so that 20 percent of its retail sales are procured from 
eligible renewable energy resources no later than December 31, 2017. 
An electrical corporation with 20 percent of retail sales procured from 
eligible renewable energy resources in any year shall not be required to 
increase its procurement of such resources in the following year.
(1) Beginning on January 1, 2003, each retail seller shall, pursuant 
to subdivision (a), increase its total procurement of eligible renewable 
energy resources by at least an additional 1 percent of retail sales per 
year so that 20 percent of its retail sales are procured from eligible 
renewable energy resources no later than December 31, 2010. 
(2) Only for purposes of establishing these targets, the commission 
shall include all power sold to retail customers by the Department of 
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Water Resources pursuant to Section 80100 of the Water Code in the 
calculation of retail sales by an electrical corporation. 
(3) In the event that an electrical corporation fails to procure 
suffi cient eligible renewable energy resources in a given year to meet 
any annual target established pursuant to this subdivision, the electrical 
corporation shall procure additional eligible renewable energy resources 
in subsequent years to compensate for the shortfall if suffi cient funds are 
made available pursuant to paragraph (2), and Section 399.6 and 
Chapter 8.6 (commencing with Section 25740) of Division 15 of the 
Public Resources Code, to cover the above-market costs of eligible 
renewables. 
(4) If supplemental energy payments from the Energy Commission, 
in combination with the market prices approved by the commission, are 
insuffi cient to cover the above-market costs of eligible renewable energy 
resources, the commission shall allow an electrical corporation to limit 
its annual procurement obligation to the quantity of eligible renewable 
energy resources that can be procured with available supplemental 
energy payments. 
(c) The commission shall establish a methodology to determine 
the market price of electricity for terms corresponding to the length of 
contracts with renewable generators, in consideration of the following: 
(1) The long-term market price of electricity for fi xed price 
contracts, determined pursuant to the electrical corporation’s general 
procurement activities as authorized by the commission. 
(2) The long-term ownership, operating, and fi xed-price fuel costs 
associated with fi xed-price electricity from new generating facilities. 
(3) The value of different products including baseload, peaking, and 
as-available output. 
(d) The establishment of a renewables portfolio standard shall not 
constitute implementation by the commission of the federal Public 
Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (Public Law 95-617). 
(e) The commission shall consult with the Energy Commission in 
calculating market prices under subdivision (c) and establishing other 
renewables portfolio standard policies. 
Section 11.  Chapter 2.4 (commencing with Section 400) is added to 
Part 1 of Division 1 of the Public Utilities Code, to read: 
CHAPTER 2.4.  THE RELIABLE ELECTRIC SERVICE ACT
400.  This chapter shall be known, and may be cited, as the Reliable 
Electric Service Act. 
400.1.  The commission and the Legislature shall do all of the following: 
(a) Restore and affi rm the electric utility’s obligation to serve all of 
its customers reliably and at just and reasonable rates. 
(b) Eliminate opportunities for market manipulation and assure the 
best value for consumers by authorizing cost-based construction and 
operation of new electric plants as well as competitive utility wholesale 
electricity procurement. 
(c) Protect consumers, the environment, and the reliability of the 
electricity system, by establishing a comprehensive long-term integrated 
resource planning process, under regulation, in order to ensure resource 
adequacy and reasonably priced electricity. Such a process shall 
include, as a fi rst priority, funding of all cost-effective energy effi ciency 
and conservation programs, and increasing the proportion of electricity 
provided from cost-effective renewable resources. 
(d) Establish and enforce resource adequacy requirements to 
ensure that adequate physical generating capacity dedicated to serving 
all load requirements is available to meet peak demand and planning 
and operating reserves, at such locations and at such times as may be 
necessary to ensure local area reliability and system reliability, at just 
and reasonable rates. Resource adequacy requirements shall apply in a 
nondiscriminatory manner to all load serving entities. 
(e) Advance and promote opportunities for consumers to use 
innovative new technologies, such as distributed generation, consistent 
with grid reliability and environmental protection and improvement, 
provided that residential and small commercial customers with average 
usage of less than 1,000 kilowatt-hours per month and occupying a 
building that was constructed prior to January 1, 2006, shall not be 
required to take service under a time-differentiated rate schedule 
without their affi rmative written consent. 
400.2.  (a) An electrical corporation has an obligation to plan 
for and provide its customers with reliable electric service at just and 
reasonable rates, pursuant to Section 451, including those customers 
who purchase standby service from the electrical corporation. 
(b) For purposes of this chapter, “electric service” includes providing 
adequate and effi cient resources, including utility-owned and procured 
generation resources, such as new and repowered generation resources, 
cogeneration, and renewable generation resources, transmission and 
distribution resources, metering and billing, funding for cost-effective 
energy effi ciency and other demand reduction resources, and employing 
an adequately sized, well-trained utility workforce, including contracting 
for maintenance of generation facilities. 
400.3.  (a) The Public Utilities Commission shall establish a 
process of resource selection and procurement that achieves the best 
value for ratepayers as its primary goal. 
(b) The commission shall ensure that each electrical corporation 
achieves the best value for its ratepayers by maintaining a diversifi ed 
portfolio of non-utility generation under contract with the utility and 
utility-owned generation, consistent with the electrical corporation’s 
approved long-term integrated resource plan, taking into account 
price, reliability, stability, effi ciency, cost-effectiveness, system 
impacts, resource diversity, fi nancial integrity of the utility, risk, and 
environmental performance. 
(c) The resource selection process may achieve the best value for 
ratepayers, as described in subdivisions (a) and (b), by utilizing the 
following approaches to compare the benefi ts and costs of alternative 
resource options: 
(1) Competitive solicitations for non-utility generation. 
(2) Bilateral contracts for non-utility generation. 
(3) Cost-based utility-owned generation that is regulated by the 
commission. 
(d) For purposes of this act, “non-utility generation” means 
facilities for the generation of electricity owned and operated by an 
entity other than an electrical corporation; and “load serving entity” 
does not include a local publicly owned electric utility as defi ned in 
Section 9604, the State Water Resources Development System commonly 
known as the State Water Project, or customer self-generation. 
400.4.  (a) The commission, in consultation with the Independent 
System Operator, shall establish resource adequacy requirements to 
ensure that adequate physical generating capacity dedicated to serving 
all load requirements is available to meet peak demand and planning 
and operating reserves, at or deliverable to such locations and at such 
times as may be necessary to ensure local area reliability and system 
reliability at just and reasonable rates. 
(b) The commission shall implement and enforce these resource 
adequacy requirements in a nondiscriminatory manner on all load 
serving entities. 
(c) Resource adequacy requirements established by the commission 
shall provide for and assure all of the following: 
(1) System wide and local area grid reliability. 
(2) Adequate physical generating capacity dedicated to serve all 
load requirements, including planning and operating reserves, where 
and when it is needed. 
(3) Adequate and timely investment in new generating capacity to meet 
future load requirements, including planning and operating reserves. 
(4) Market power mitigation. 
(5) Deliverability. 
(6) Resource commitments by load serving entities at least three 
years in advance of need, in order to assure that new resources can be 
constructed if necessary to meet the need. 
(d) Pursuant to its authority to revoke or suspend registration 
pursuant to Section 394.25, the commission shall suspend the registration 
for a specifi ed period, or revoke the registration, of an electric service 
provider that fails to comply with the rules and regulations adopted by the 
commission to enforce resource adequacy requirements. 
Section 12.  The Legislature may amend this act only to achieve its 
purposes and intent, by legislation receiving at least a two-thirds vote of 
each house and signature by the Governor. 
Section 13.  The provisions of this act are severable. If any 
provision of this act or its application is held invalid, that invalidity 
shall not affect other provisions or applications that can be given effect 
without the invalid provision or application.
